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General Equilibrium Analysis of Japan's Tax Reform
Kyoji Hashimoto and ToshiyukI Uemura
The Murayama tax reform was reductions of the income tax and
3% to 5% the changing from the consumption tax rate. And the
distribution standard of the consumption transfer tax to local gov
ernments was changed to based upon retail consumption from
population and number of employees.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the economic effect of
the Japanese tax reform by the Applied General Equilibrium
model. As a result, the Murayama tax reform barely improves the
social welfare. However, the degree of the improvement is very
small. We think that it is necessary to reduce further marginal tax
rate to improve efficiency.
Keywords: Applied General Equilibrium, Tax reform. Decentralized economy
1. Introduction
Murayama Cabinet executed tax reform from 1994 to 1997 In Japan. The
pillar of the tax reform was reductions of the income tax and 3% to 5% the
changing from the consumption tax (value added tax) rate. Increasing the
minimum taxable floor mainly has reduced the individual income tax
(national income tax) and the inhabitant tax (local income tax). In addition,
the local consumption tax was introduced. The local consumption tax is
taxed partially of the consumption tax as the national tax, and the tax rate
is 1%. The revenue of the local consumption tax is distributed to each local
government. The distribution standard is the retail sales in each local gov
ernment. The local consumption tax introduced instead of the consumption
transfer tax. The consumption transfer tax was the one that would have
required that 1/5 of the revenue of the consumption tax is distributed to
each local government. However, the distribution standard of the con
sumption transfer tax was based upon not retail consumption, but popula
tion and number of employees. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the
economic effect of the Japanese tax reform.
We use the Applied General Equilibrium (AGE) model. Ballard,
Fullerton, Shoven and Whalley (1985) and Ichioka (1991)' tasks are famous
as the AGE models. Our model has expanded their models in the following
points. First, our model considers not only the central government but also
the local governments. The local governments receive the general subsi
dies (it is called the local allocation tax in Japan) from the central govern
ment. Secondly, the 47 prefectures are considered in our model. In each
local area (government), one private industry and one public industry exist.
In addition, households are grouped according to 11-age class in each local
area. Thirdly, we are perfectly reproducing a nonlinear income tax function.
In the paper of Ballard, Fullerton, and Shoven and Whalley (1985) and
Ichioka (1991), the income tax is expressed by applying the linear tax func
tion of each income class. However, their papers disregard the possibility
that the household may move to another tax bracket after the tax reform.
The household might move to higher tax bracket by the tax reform when
the labor supply is changeable. We solve such a problem by examining all
the effect levels in the nonlinear budget constraint.
2. Model
In this section, we describe the basic structure of the model. First of all, let's
explain our model's assumption. The households with different income lev
els exist in each local area. They supply labor and capital. The labor supply
and capital supply depends respectively on the labor demand and capital
demand in each local area. The household obtains the labor income and
the capital income, consumes and saves. Consumption composes the
demand for goods and saving compose the investment demand.
Moreover, two industries, which produce the private goods and the local
public goods respectively, exist in each local area (government). The cen
tral government and the local governments are assumed as the govern
ment sector. The central government assumes the national tax to be funds,
and distributes the subsidies to the local governments, which supply the
local public goods. And, the central government provides the transfer pay
ment to the households. The each local government levies the inhabitant
tax and the enterprise tax as local taxes. The local government expends the
total amounts of local tax revenue and subsidies distributed by the central
government to the local public goods.
2.1. Household
The following nested CES type utility functions are assumed to the utility
function of the ^ 0 = 1, J) household in the I) local areas. The
subscript is respectively the local areas and income class. To avoid mak
ing this overly complex, we omit these subscripts in the following expres-
sions^
+  (1)
H=[aX-p''+(\-a)XF'']-^''^ (2)
Here, H \s a composite of present consumption goods (Xp) and future con
sumption goods (Xp), L is the endowment of labor, Ls is the labor supply,
is the weighting parameter between H and leisure (L-Ls), a is the
weighting parameter between Xp and Xp. £=1/(1 +/u) is the elasticity
between composite good (H) and leisure. cr= l/(l-i-r;) is the elasticity
between present consumption goods (Xp) and future consumption goods
(Xp), The budget constraint of the household in each local area is
wLs+ (1 — TR)rF+ Tp— Tm— Tl=PhH=ppXp+ppXp (3)
where tp is the interest income tax rate, F is the financial asset, Tp is the
social security benefit, w is the wage rate, r is the rental price of capital, pn
is the price of composite goods (H), pp is the price of present consumption
goods (Xp), Pp is future consumption goods (Xp)^. And Tn is the individual
income tax function, Tp is the inhabitant tax function. These are the nonlin
ear function of labor income. If the labor income is given, the amount of
the income tax can be calculated by applying the tax system before and
after the Murayama tax reform being shown in Table 1^.
For example, a household exits who earned 10,000,000 yen for a year.
The amount of an individual income tax for this household can be calcu
lated as follows. Let's assume this household to be composed of the mar
ried couple and two children. First of all, we calculate an adjusted gross
1 We think that it is necessary to include local public goods in the utility function (1). However, the
result of the research which can be trusted hardly exists to our regret about the preference parame
ter for local public goods. Moreover, local public goods are modeled by the additive type in the util
ity function, and do not influence the household's marginal condition. Then, we disregard this
problem in this paper.
2  In our model, the social security benefit is processed unlike the model of Ballard, Fullerton, Shoven
and Whalley (1985) as the exogenous variable.
3  See Ishi (1989) and Homma, Maeda, and Hashimoto (1987) for details of the Japanese tax system.
Table 1 The outline of Murayama Tax Reform
Before tax reform After tax reform
Special
deduction for
employment
income
Employment income Deductions^
(yen) (percent)
Less than 1,650,000 40
1,650,000- 3,300,000 30
3,300,000- 6,000,000 20
6,000,000-10,000,000 10
10,000,000 and over 5
Employment income Deductions^
(yen) (percent)
Less than 1,800,000 40
1,800,000- 3,600,000 30
3,600,000- 6,600,000 20
6,600,000-10,000,000 10
10,000,000 and over 5
Personal
exemption
(National
income tax)
Basic aJlowance 350,000 yen
Allowance for spouse 350,000 yen
Special allowance for spouse 350,000 yen
Allowance for dependent 350,000 yen
Basic allowance 380,000 yen
Allowance for spouse 380,000 yen
Special allowance for spouse 380,000 yen
Allowance for dependent 380,000 yen
Personal
exemption
(Inhabitant
tax)
Basic allowance 310,000 yen
Allowance for spouse 310,000 yen
Special allowance for spouse 310,000 yen
Allowance for dependent 301,000 yen
Basic allowance 330,000 yen
Allowance for spouse 330,000 yen
Special allowance for spouse 330,000 yen
Allowance for dependent 330,000 yen
Tax rates
(National
income tax)
Taxable income Tax rates
(yen) (percent)
Less than 3,000,000 10
3,000,000- 6,000,000 20
6,000,000-10,000,000 30
10,000,000-20,000,000 40
More than 20,000,000 50
Taxable income Tax rates
(yen) (percent)
Less than 3,300,000 10
3,300,000- 9,000,000 20
9,000,000-18,000,000 30
18,000,000-30,000,000 40
More than 30,000,000 50
Tax rates
(Inhabitant
tax)
Taxable income Tax rates
(yen) (percent)
Less than 1,600,000 5
1,600,000-5,500,000 10
More than 5,500,000 15
Taxable income Tax rates
(yen) (percent)
Less than 2,000,000 5
2,000,000-7,000,000 10
More than 7,000,000 15
' The minimum deduction is 650,000 yen.
income by subtracting a special deduction for employment income from
the labor income. In this case of after tax reform, the adjusted gross
income becomes 7,800,000 yen (=10,000,000-(1,800,000 x 0.4+(3,600,000-
1,800,000) X 0.3 + (6,600,000 - 3,600,000) x 0.2 + (10,000,000 - 6,600,000) x
0.1) for this example. Next, we obtain the taxable income by subtracting
the personal exemption and deductions for specified expenditures from
this adjusted gross income. We consider only the deduction for social
insurance premiums as deductions for specified expenditure in this paper.
The social insurance premiums becomes almost equal to the one that
amount to multiply 7% by the part of the labor income of 5,000,000 or less
and amount to multiply 2% by the labor income of 5,000,000 yen or more
are totaled according to Ministry of Finance. Thus, the deduction for social
insurance premiums is 450,000 yen ( = 5,000,000 x 0.7 +(10,000,000-
5,000,000) X 0.2). The taxable income is 5,450,000 yen ( = 7,800,000-38-
38 - 38 - 38 - 38 - 45). Finally, we can obtain the amount of the income tax
by applying the tax rate table to the taxable income. The amount of the
income tax is 760,000 yen (= 3,300,000 x 0.1 + (5,450,000 - 3,300,000) x 0.2).
Here, the financial asset assumes that the real asset K is converted in a
constant ratio 6 as shown by Eq. (4).
F=dK (4)
The labor supply Ls is the function of the wage rate, the rental price of cap
ital, the interest income tax rate, the financial asset, the social security ben
efit, the individual income tax, and the inhabitant tax.
Ls = Ls (w, r, Xr, F, Tf, Tr, Tr) (5)
We should note that the individual income tax and the inhabitant tax are
the function of labor because the income tax and the inhabitant tax depend
on the labor income. In the past models, simplifying the tax function to
constant marginal tax rate and tax credit has solved this problem.
However, the nonlinear function is assumed as the tax function in our
model. Therefore, we cannot algebraically derive the supply function. We
calculate the labor supply by a numeric calculation. The calculation method
is as follows:
1. An initial value of L5 is given under any price ratio.
2. Because the income tax and the inhabitant tax can be evaluated when
the labor supply is decided, consumption H can be calculated from Eq.
(3).
3. Once we substitute Ls and 77 for Eq. (1), we can calculate the utility level.
4. Once we repeat the above-mentioned procedure, we can obtain the
value of L5 by which the utility maximization is achieved.
The household chooses Xp and Xf to maximize Eq. (2) subject to Eq. (3).
The demand function of present consumption is
y _ cc'^{wLs+ (1 ~ TR)rF+ Tp— Tn— 71} ,g,
^  ppiW^pp'"+ {\-aypF~°)
The demand function of future consumption is
(1 - a)''{wLs+ (1 - Tfi)rF+ 7>- Tn-Tl)
ppia^pp'" + (l - a)''py'')
^ _ Vi \H^iv -rvi LR)i± -r±F j.n J^Lf
Here, the price of the present consumption and future consumption is
respectively
Pp=(1 + Ti)Pi (8)
(1 + Tibl
Pf= 7 ; r-r O){1 + (1-Tfl)r}
where pi is the producer price of private sector, t/ is the consumption tax
rate. And the function if is a composite of Xp and Xp, and the composite
price index is
+  (10)
We obtain the saving (S) from the demand for future consumption and
the price;
S=PfXf. (11)
We use the relation of saving and capital, the investment demand (Xi) is
r f I J I J I J A
(12)
P^\i=lj=\ i=\j=l i=lj=l J
where C\ is the share parameter that distributed investment to the local
areas i, 'LiCii= 1 is approved.
2.2. Industry
Next, we will explain the industry's behavior. We assume that one industry
produces the consumer goods and the other industry produce the public
goods in each local area. Each industry's production is based on the follow
ing production functions
Qm = ^LjKj-^ m=l, 2 (13)
where O is the parameter of efficiency, S is the parameter of labor share.
The subscript m is the industry. The m = 1 is the industry produced private
goods, and the m = 2 is the industry produced public goods. Yet, we omit
the subscript on local areas for simplicity.
The cost function per unit of output is
\=wLm.+ {\ + TcK+'^LK)fKm m = 1, 2 (14)
where tck is the corporation income tax rate, xlk is the enterprise tax rate.
Once we minimize the cost function subject to the production function, we
have the following factor demand function per unit of output.
ll-5
m=l, 2 (15)
dil + TcK+rudr
(lQ -d)w
{l-d)w
.5(l + rcK+riK)r.
m=l2 (16)
We can show the producer price pm as a function of the factor price accord
ing to the profit zero conditions.
L  KPi = w^-l-(l + TcA:+Tz,A:)r--p (17)
Lo KoP2='W— + r— (18)
(^2 V2
2.3. Government
Next, we explain the budget constraints of the governments. The tax rev
enue of central government R is
I  j I j I j I
^ ^ Tn+ ^  ^ TrvF + ^  ^ TipiXp+ ^  TcktKi (19)
i=1J= 1 i=\j=\ i=\j=\ i=\
where the first term is the individual tax, the interest income tax, the con
sumption tax, and the corporation income tax on the right hand. Here, i is
the subscript of the local governments (areas), and j is the subscript of
households.
We suppose that the central government allocates the national tax rev
enue to the local consumption transfer tax (local consumption tax) and the
local allocation tax, the social security benefits (7», and the public invest-
ment. The local consumption transfer tax and the local allocation tax Is dis
tributed to local governments. The social security benefit Is distributed to
households In each local government. The consumption transfer tax J Is
the 1/5 of the consumption tax revenue. We calculate that the local alloca
tion tax B Is the total amount both 24 percent of the consumption tax rev
enue out of the consumption transfer tax and 32 percent of the Individual
Income tax and the corporation Income tax"*.
T/Pi-Xp
3 i= 1 j= 1
(20)
5 = 0.24 X
( I j
^iPiXp-J
Vi=lj=l y
(21)ti J I J I
rRrF+ X t^cktKi
i=\j=\ i=\j=\ i=l
We suppose that the public Investment (Xg) Is allocated to each local
government by the allocation parameter Cq (Xt = Cg,; = 1).
I  (22)
Pi V i=ij=i y
Each local government supply the local public goods that are financed by
the Inhabitant tax, the enterprise tax, the transfer tax from the national con
sumption tax, and the local allocation tax. As a result, we have the follow
ing equation,
P2G = CjJ-I- CbB + ^  Ti + Ci^. Tlk^Ki (23)
j=\ i=\
where ps Is the producer price of public sector, Cj Is the share parameter of
consumption transfer tax, Cb Is the share parameter of local allocation tax,
Cl Is the share parameter of the enterprise tax (respectively 'LiCj= 1,
l.iCB- 1, Y.iCL = 1).
2.4. Market equilibrium
We show the market equilibrium condition. In the private goods market,
4  See Mochida (1998) for details of the local allocation tax.
the total output of the private goods becomes equal to the total of con
sumer demand, private investment and public investment
Qu^i^Xpi+XH + Xoi !,•••,/ (24)
j-i
where the i is subscript about local areas, the j is subscript about the
household in the local areas. In the public goods market, the amount of
public goods in the i's local areas (Qi^) is equal to the demand for public
goods;
Qi2 = Gi i=l, ,I (25)
Once we substitute thus these demands into factor demand functions
per unit, we get the factor demands for labor (LDim) and the factor
demands for capital (KDim) where m = 1 is the subscript of private goods
(private sector), and m = 2 is subscript of public goods (public sector). As a
result, the excess demand function on the labor market is
EDL = xi (26)
i=lm=l i=l j=l
and the excess demand on the capital market is
EDK=a, KDm-HK. (27)
1 m= 1 i= 1 i= 1
We calculate the factor prices (w and r) cleared all markets by Merrill algo
rithm^.
3. Data set and parameter set
To set the parameters given to the model presented in the foregoing para
graph, the data set is made in this chapter. In standard applied general
equilibrium analysis, the data set of a benchmark equilibrium is made that
the factor price ratio and net tax prices are all unity. So, it is necessary to
make the data set with the feature that labor, capital, private goods and
public goods market is all clear and additionally being filled by the budget
constraints of all households, the central government and all local govern-
5  See Hashimoto and Uemura (1995) for the method of the Merrill algorithm.
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merits. The method of setting the data set and the parameters according to
the economic agents is described as follows noting these.
3.1. Data of household
The household is distinguished according to local areas and age classes.
First of all, data concerning labor is described. The labor income of house
holds is obtained by adding and matching "Amount of wage and salary in
cash which is decided and provided" and "Amount of the compassionate
allowance besides the bonus during year" referring to the industrial scale
total according to age class and local areas in 1996 in The Investigation of
the Wage Structure (Chingin kozo kiso chosa) (1997)' (Ministry of Labor)®.
The labor supply time is obtained by adding "Actual working hour" and
"Excess actual working hour". The amount of the labor supply L is pre
sumed by dividing the time that the working hour of one year can be used
during a year'. The labor endowment L is obtained by dividing the labor
income on the amount of the labor supply because it is assumed that it is
the labor income when all the total time that can be used during a year is
spent in the labor supply. In addition, "Number of workers" is assumed to
be the distribution of households in the model. The data of social security
benefit Tp is published in "Annual Report on the Family income and
Expenditure Survey".
Well, the amount of consumption, the amount of savings, and the
amount of the interest income cannot be obtained from 'The Investigation
of the Wage Structure' data. These are estimated by calculating the aver
age propensity to consume according to the age class obtained from the
worker household data of 'Family Income and Expenditure Survey (Kakei
chosa nenpo) (1996)' and 'Family Saving Survey (Chotiku doko chosa
nenpo) (1995-1996)' (Statistics Bureau Management and Coordination
Agency Japan). "Persons per household", "Household head current
income", "Social security benefits", "Living expenditure", "Earned income
tax", "Personal local inhabitant taxes", and "Social security expenditure"
are corrected from 'Annual Report on the Family Income and Expenditure
6  The age division of 'Wage Census' is "-17 years old", "18-19 years old", "20-24 years old", "25-29
years old", and, hereafter, has 12 classes. It was assumed that "-17 years old" and "18-19 years
old" is integrated here in consideration of the correspondence of another data and all ages less
than 20 years old were combined into a single class.
7  Here, time that the household's time of a day that can be used during a year is calculated, as 16
hours per day.
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Survey' and "Savings - Liabilities" is corrected from 'Family Savings
Survey' every 10000 yen in the annual sum. The interest income is
obtained by multiplying the rate of return of 3.275% by net saving (= sav
ings - liabilities). The average yield of the year of the Tokyo Stock Exchange
national debt futures of 'Economic Statistics Annual (Keizai tokei nenpo)'
(Research and Statistics Department Bank of Japan) is used for this rate of
return in 1996. The interest income tax multiplies 20% by interest income
and is calculated. The disposable income can be calculated by being able
to calculate the gross income by adding and matching "Household head
current income", "Social security benefits", and interest income, and sub
tracting "Earned income tax", "Social security expenditure", and the inter
est income tax in addition. The average propensity to consume can be
obtained by dividing "Living expenditure" in the disposable income
according to the age class.
Next, we estimate the household's capital as follows. Because the esti
mate from micro data is impossible, the macro data is used about the
household's capital. The labor income according to local areas can be
obtained by totaling the one that distribution of households was multiplied
by above-mentioned labor income wL. The capital labor ratio according to
local areas is calculated by dividing "Operating surplus" in "Compensation
of employees" of "Total" in "Gross domestic product and factor income by
kind of economic activity" of 'Annual Report Prefecture Accounts (Kokumin
keizai keisan nenpo)' (Economic Planning Agency)®. In addition, the capital
income according to the local areas is obtained by multiplying the labor
income by the capital labor ratio. The capital is distributed to each house
hold according to age classes and local areas by assuming that this capital
income composes the capital of the household, and using distribution of
households with the labor income®. On the other hand, the total of interest
income can be calculated by considering the distribution of households
according to the interest income obtained from 'Family Saving Survey'
data. If the total amount of this interest income is divided by the amount of
the total capital, conversion parameter 0 = 8.363% from the total capital to
8  Data is used here in the 1995 fiscal year and labor income in the 1996 fiscal year according to local
areas and capital income are used by multiplying each expansion rate of labor income of 'Annual
Report on National Accounts' (Economic Planning Agency) and capital income in 1996 estimating.
9  Then, when the labor income is high, this household will have a lot of capital. Therefore, it is
assumed that the capital that has been built in the past becomes large, too, if the earning power is
high.
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the financial asset will be obtained.
Therefore, the amount of the consumption including tax (consumption
tax) of the household according to the age class and local areas can be esti
mated. In a word, the average propensity to consume according to the age
class was multiplied by the total of the interest income with the labor
income. However, 'Family Income and Expenditure Survey' and 'Family
Saving Survey' are "-24 years old", "25-29 years old", and, hereafter, are
published even "65-years old-" in the data of ten age classes at intervals of
five years. Therefore, we think that has the same average propensity to
consume as "-24 years old" about less than 20 years old to match to the 11
age classes previously made. Moreover, the social security benefits of
other age classes assume that is the same, 'Family Income and Expenditure
Survey' by thinking that the social security benefits is 0 by assuming the
home individually and assuming that the number of men in the home who
are less than 20 years old to be one person.
Let's describe taxes that the household bears. The amount of the
income and residence tax burden can be calculated by applying the income
and the residence tax system in 1996 fiscal year to the labor income.
However, the marginal tax rate of the excessively graduated type is multi
plied by the obtained taxable income by using data of "Persons per house
hold", and amount by which special tax reductions executed in 1996 fiscal
year are subtracted is calculated. At this time, the special deduction for the
labor income (employment income), the basic allowance, the allowance for
spouse, the allowance for dependent, the special allowance for spouse, and
deduction for social insurance premiums are assumed as a deduction from
taxable income. The amount of the interest income tax burden is assumed
to be 20% of the separate tax withheld at source to interest income. The
amount of the consumption tax can be calculated by multiplying effective
tax rate (3/103) on the "Living consumption"^®.
The total of the labor income, the interest income and the social secu
rity benefits is the gross incomes as a result of the above-mentioned, and
calculating the disposable income becomes possible by subtracting the
income tax, the inhabitant tax, and the interest income tax from the gross
income. In addition, the amount of savings can be presumed by subtract
ing the amount of the consumption tax from the disposable income. It is
10 The indirect taxes other than the consumption tax are not considered for the simplification.
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possible to total by considering the distribution of households according to
local areas, although these variables were presumed according to the age
class and local areas.
3.2. Data of industry
We assumed that two industries, which produce private goods (private sec
tor) and public goods (public sector), existed respectively in each local area
as mentioned above. We attempt the joint with micro data of the house
hold to data of firm by using macro data.
"Labor income" of "Government service producer" is published in
'Annual Report on Prefecture Accounts' according to local areas. We use
this data as the labor income of the public sector. However, because the
operating surplus is 0 in the definition, we cannot estimate capital income
on the public sector. Then, because "Labor income" of "Producers of gov
ernment services" is subtracted from "Labor income" of "Total", the labor
income according to local areas of a private sector is obtained. The capital
labor ratio of a private sector can be calculated by dividing "Operating sur
plus" of "Total" in the labor income of a private sector according to local
areas. A capital income of the public sector can be estimated by multiply
ing the labor income of the public sector if it is assumed that a private sec
tor is equal to the capital labor ratio of the public sector.
The revenue of the corporation income tax in the 1996 fiscal year is
published in 'Tax Administration Agency Statistics Annual Report
(Kokuzeicho tokei nenpo sho)' (Tax Administration Agency) in 1998. The
revenue of the enterprise tax in the 1996 fiscal year is published in 'Local
Public Finance Statistics Annual (Chihou zaisei tokei nenpo)' (Local
Financial Affairs Society) respectively in 1998. We assumed capital income
tax to be taxed at the stage, which had been distributed from the firm to
the household as capital income. We assume that the average tax rate of
the corporation tax and the enterprise tax divide the revenue of the corpo
ration tax and the enterprise tax respectively by the total capital income.
However, we should note that the capital levy is included in the total capital
income in this case. We obtained the corporation tax rate as 14.93% and
the enterprise tax rate as 5.50%^L The amount of the capital levy can be
11 If we think the deficit corporation bears neither the corporation income tax nor the enterprise tax, it
can be said an appropriate value though the value here is a value which is considerably lower than
the statutory tax rate of an actual corporation income tax and the enterprise tax.
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obtained when these tax rate are applied to an all-in capital levy capital
income according to local areas, and capital income excluding tax be calcu
lated.
Well, we can obtain the aggregated consumption excluding tax from
the data set of household to each local area. The distribution parameter Cc
was made by using "Final consumption expenditure of households" data
of "Private final consumption expenditure" in "Total inhabitants of the pre
fecture expenditure (nominal)" of 'Annual Report on Prefecture Accounts'
about the distribution of consumption to each local areas. In addition, the
amount by which interest income is subtracted the gross saving of the
household and in total of real capital becomes gross investment, is distrib
uted this to each local areas, and composes a part of the private invest
ment. The distribution parameter Q was made by using "Gross domestic
fixed capital formation" data of "Private" of the distribution standard at this
time in "Total inhabitants of the prefecture expense (nominal)" of 'Annual
Report on Prefecture Accounts'. Moreover, the public investment by which
a part of the national tax is assumed to be funds is done by the central gov
ernment in the model, and this becomes the demand component of a pri
vate sector, too. The consumption excluding tax demand for a private
sector and the total of the private investment and the public investment
should be corresponding to a capital income excluding tax because of the
general equilibrium condition with the labor income in each administrative
division. Then, the total of the amount of consumption excluding tax, the
private investment, and the public investment of each local area is divided
in proportion by using the ratio of a capital income excluding tax with the
labor income of a private sector. We can calculate a labor income and a
capital income of a private sector in benchmark equilibrium through such a
procedure. We can calculate the corporation tax revenue and the enterprise
tax revenue by multiplying capital tax rate by a capital income.
On the other hand, all the revenue of the local governments and funds
of the local transfer tax from a central government allocated to local gov
ernments are spent in the production of local public goods in the public
sector in the model. Therefore, it is necessary to meet a corresponding
general equilibrium requirement to the total of a capital income with the
labor income of funds and the public sector of local governments. Funds of
local governments are divided in proportion in the ratio of capital incomes
with the labor income of the public sector previously obtained concerning
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this, and a capital income is fixed as the labor income in benchmark equi
librium according to local areas of the public sector. However, details of the
annual revenue of the local governments are described later.
3.3. Parameter
We calculate the share parameter Cj from "Amount of the consumption
transfer tax according to local governments" in 1996 fiscal year of 'Local
Public Finance Statistics Annual'. The share parameter Cb is calculated by
"Amount of the local transfer tax allocated to local governments delivery"
in 1996 fiscal year of 'Local Public Finance Statistics Annual'. We estimate
the share parameter Co from the data in 'Annual Report Prefecture
Accounts'. The share parameter Cl is estimated by "Amount of the enter
prise tax revenue" data of 'Local Public Finance Statistics Annual' in the
1996 fiscal year.
We explain the estimation method of the inter-temporal elasticity of
substitution a and the weighting parameter a of the consumption on utility
function (2). The estimation of these parameters is very difficult because
Eq. (6) and (7) is a nonlinear equation. Then, these parameters fixed to (7 =
0.2 as well as the preceding research such as Hashimoto and Uemura
(1997) and counted a according to each household backward by a conver
gent calculation. Next, the weighting parameter P of utility function (1) is
fixed to elasticity of substitution e = 0.4 for leisure and composite of con
sumption by the same reason, and calculated by the settling calculation
according to each households.
Finally, we explain the estimation method of parameter on the produc
tion function. The capital income including tax or the capital income
excluding tax turns out a private sector in the benchmark equilibrium and
the labor income of the public sector from the data set of the firm. Because
the Cobb= Douglas type is assumed to be the production function in the
model, the share parameter 5 is equal to the amount that labor income
including tax and capital income divided the labor income in total. It can be
set that a work turning on and the capital excluding tax, turning on produce
aggregate demands concerning the efficiency parameter O to meet the
requirement of aggregate demand equal aggregate supply. However, 5
obtained here is equally calculated by the public sector with the private sec
tor in local areas. The reason is to have assumed that the capital labor ratio
is equal by the public sector with the private sector in the data set of the
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firm. However, It can be Interpreted that the efficiency of production Is dif
ferent though the agent of production has been turned on by the public
sector with the private sector In the same ratio In local areas because the
efficiency parameter takes a different value.
The parameter of the utility function and the production function by
which the benchmark equilibrium which was made by the data set Is com
pletely reproduced as a result of the above-mentioned was able to be set.
The estimated result of a and p which Is the parameters of the utility func
tion, Is shown In Table 2 and 3. Moreover, the estimate result of O and 5,
which Is the parameters of the production function Is shown In Table 4.
4. Simulation analysis
Once we use the above-mentioned model, we can examine the economic
effect of the Murayama tax reform^^. In the Murayama tax reform, the Intro
duction of the local consumption tax In addition to Income tax cut and the
tax Increase of the consumption tax was executed. Therefore, we analyze
the reformation of not only the national taxes but also local taxes.
First of all, we show the Influence, which the switch from the local
transfer tax to local consumption tax gives to the revenue distribution
between local governments. In the Figure 1, we can see the change of tax
revenue per capita. Figure 1 shows the reduction of tax revenue In Tokyo.
And, the revenue of a local city In Ishlkawa, MIe, and Nagasaki, etc.
decreases. Therefore, the Murayama tax revision leads to the reduction of
the revenue difference between local governments.
Next, Table 5 shows the change In the amount of production of the pri
vate goods and public goods Industry according to local areas. The output
of private goods Increases In all local areas. It means that the reduction of
progressive tax rates on Income tax Improve the economic efficiency. On
the other hand, the change In the amount of production of the public
goods Industry Is different according to local area. These changes corre
spond to the change of revenue In Figure 1.
Finally, we see the change In each household's welfare level In Table 5.
In this simulation, we are not 5% of the reality, and set the consumption tax
rate to 4.144917%. Because, we must analyze the pure effect of tax reform
12 See Hashimoto, Otake, Atoda, Saito, and Homma (1990) for details of Japanese tax reform.
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Table 2 Parameter a of utility function (cr = 0.2)
Age -20 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-
Hokkaido 0.9991 0.9991 0.9838 0.8788 0.8624 0.9173 0.9851 0.9496 0.9323 0.9827 0.6547
Aomori 0.9991 0.9991 0.9846 0.8827 0.8666 0.9202 0.9858 0.9516 0.9348 0.9834 0.6595
Iwate 0.9991 0.9991 0.9844 0.8817 0.8655 0.9195 0.9856 0.9511 0.9342 0.9832 0.6591
Miyagi 0.9990 0.9990 0.9831 0.8753 0.8584 0.9146 0.9844 0.9478 0.9300 0.9821 0.6499
Akita 0.9991 0.9991 0.9842 0.8808 0.8645 0.9189 0.9855 0.9507 0.9337 0.9831 0.6559
Yamagata 0.9990 0.9990 0.9833 0.8762 0.8595 0.9153 0.9846 0.9482 0.9306 0.9822 0.6510
Fukushima 0.9990 0.9990 0.9828 0.8741 0.8572 0.9137 0.9841 0.9471 0.9293 0.9819 0.6495
Ibaragi 0.9991 0.9991 0.9841 0.8802 0.8638 0.9184 0.9854 0.9504 0.9333 0.9830 0.6571
Tochigi 0.9991 0.9991 0.9846 0.8828 0.8667 0.9204 0.9858 0.9517 0.9350 0.9835 0.6600
Gunma 0.9991 0.9991 0.9838 0.8787 0.8622 0.9172 0.9850 0.9496 0.9323 0.9828 0.6553
Saitama 0.9991 0.9991 0.9844 0.8820 0.8659 0.9198 0.9857 0.9514 0.9345 0.9834 0.6603
Chlba 0.9992 0.9992 0.9851 0.8851 0.8692 0.9222 0.9863 0.9529 0.9365 0.9840 0.6649
Tokyo 0.9989 0.9989 0.9817 0.8688 0.8515 0.9098 0.9831 0.9444 0.9259 0.9811 0.6444
Kanagawa 0.9990 0.9990 0.9831 0.8752 0.8585 0.9147 0.9844 0.9478 0.9301 0.9823 0.6514
Niigata 0.9990 0.9990 0.9834 0.8770 0.8604 0.9159 0.9847 0.9487 0.9312 0.9825 0.6531
Toyama 0.9990 0.9990 0.9834 0.8769 0.8602 0.9158 0.9847 0.9486 0.9311 0.9825 0.6531
Ishikawa 0.9990 0.9990 0.9834 0.8767 0.8601 0.9158 0.9847 0.9486 0.9310 0.9824 0.6525
Fukui 0.9990 0.9989 0.9827 0.8735 0.8566 0.9133 0.9840 0.9468 0.9289 0.9818 0.6493
Vamanashi 0.9991 0.9990 0.9836 0.8780 0.8614 0.9167 0.9849 0.9492 0.9318 0.9827 0.6536
Nagano 0.9990 0.9990 0.9835 0.8775 0.8609 0.9163 0.9848 0.9489 0.9315 0.9825 0.6542
Gifu 0.9991 0.9990 0.9836 0.8781 0.8615 0.9167 0.9849 0.9492 0.9319 0.9827 0.6549
Shizuoka 0.9990 0.9990 0.9834 0.8768 0.8601 0.9158 0.9847 0.9486 0.9311 0.9824 0.6526
Aichi 0.9990 0.9990 0.9835 0.8774 0.8609 0.9163 0.9848 0.9490 0.9315 0.9826 0.6549
Mie 0.9991 0.9990 0.9837 0.8783 0.8618 0.9170 0.9850 0.9495 0.9321 0.9828 0.6542
Shiga 0.9993 0.9992 0.9858 0.8890 0.8736 0.9251 0.9870 0.9551 0.9391 0.9846 0.6679
Kyoto 0.9990 0.9990 0.9832 0.8760 0.8593 0.9152 0.9845 0.9482 0.9305 0.9823 0.6530
Osaka 0.9989 0.9989 0.9824 0.8722 0.8552 0.9124 0.9838 0.9462 0.9281 0.9817 0.6483
Hyogo 0.9990 0.9990 0.9836 0.8777 0.8611 0.9165 0.9849 0.9491 0.9317 0.9827 0.6554
Nara 0.9991 0.9991 0.9843 0.8812 0.8650 0.9192 0.9856 0.9509 0.9340 0.9832 0.6589
Wakayama 0.9990 0.9990 0.9834 0.8766 0.8599 0.9157 0.9846 0.9485 0.9309 0.9825 0.6535
Tottori 0.9991 0.9990 0.9837 0.8783 0.8618 0.9169 0.9850 0.9493 0.9320 0.9826 0.6541
Shimane 0.9990 0.9990 0.9834 0.8769 0.8602 0.9158 0.9847 0.9486 0.9310 0.9823 0.6523
Okayama 0.9990 0.9990 0.9834 0.8770 0.8604 0.9160 0.9847 0.9487 0.9312 0.9825 0.6537
Hiroshinna 0.9990 0.9990 0.9830 0.8747 0.8578 0.9142 0.9843 0.9475 0.9297 0.9821 0.6512
Yamaguchi 0.9991 0.9991 0.9838 0.8787 0.8622 0.9172 0.9850 0.9496 0.9323 0.9827 0.6560
Tokushima 0.9991 0.9991 0.9839 0.8793 0.8629 0.9178 0.9852 0.9499 0.9327 0.9828 0.6567
Kagawa 0.9990 0.9990 0.9834 0.8770 0.8603 0.9159 0.9847 0.9487 0.9311 0.9824 0.6527
Ehime 0.9991 0.9991 0.9839 0.8794 0.8630 0.9178 0.9852 0.9499 0.9327 0.9828 0.6562
Kochi 0.9991 0.9991 0.9842 0.8806 0.8643 0.9187 0.9854 0.9506 0.9335 0.9831 0.6578
Fukuoka 0.9990 0.9990 0.9831 0.8754 0.8586 0.9147 0.9844 0.9478 0.9301 0.9822 0.6521
Saga 0.9990 0.9990 0.9832 0.8758 0.8590 0.9150 0.9845 0.9480 0.9304 0.9822 0.6229
Nagasaki 0.9992 0.9991 0.9848 0.8837 0.8677 0.9211 0.9860 0.9522 0.9356 0.9837 0.6640
Kumamoto 0.9991 0.9991 0.9842 0.8806 0.8643 0.9187 0.9854 0.9505 0.9335 0.9830 0.6570
Gita 0.9991 0.9991 0.9841 0.8805 0.8642 0.9186 0.9854 0.9505 0.9334 0.9831 0.6590
Miyazaki 0.9991 0.9990 0.9834 0.8766 0.8599 0.9156 0.9846 0.9484 0.9309 0.9823 0.6536
Kagoshima 0.9990 0.9990 0.9830 0.8751 0.8582 0.9145 0.9843 0.9476 0.9299 0.9820 0.6509
Okinawa 0.9992 0.9984 0.9849 0.8845 0.8685 0.9217 0.9862 0.9526 0.9361 0.9837 0.6602
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Table 3 Parameter p of utility function (£* = 0.4)
Age -20 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-
Hokkaido 0.7921 0.7634 0.7975 0.8403 0.8511 0.8389 0.8223 0.8404 0.8402 0.7498 0.6879
Aomori 0.7774 0.7434 0.7909 0.8196 0.8285 0.8228 0.8055 0.8301 0.8213 0.7179 0.6306
Iwate 0.8198 0.7820 0.8015 0.8381 0.8369 0.8435 0.8238 0.8491 0.8528 0.7486 0.6911
Miyagi 0.8058 0.7913 0.8172 0.8559 0.8678 0.8572 0.8452 0.8630 0.8682 0.7865 0.6823
Akita 0.7870 0.7746 0.8053 0.8319 0.8424 0.8444 0.8338 0.8464 0.8633 0.7610 0.6827
Yamagata 0.7961 0.7628 0.7973 0.8307 0.8259 0.8363 0.8233 0.8439 0.8346 0.7259 0.6199
Fukushima 0.8173 0.7821 0.8117 0.8448 0.8512 0.8491 0.8324 0.8493 0.8504 0.7635 0.7135
Ibaragi 0.8002 0.7862 0.8143 0.8396 0.8458 0.8468 0.8275 0.8271 0.8439 0.7531 0.7213
Tochigi 0.7981 0.7588 0.8001 0.8416 0.8420 0.8424 0.8202 0.8490 0.8426 0.7584 0.7028
Gunma 0.8070 0.7642 0.7977 0.8305 0.8323 0.8382 0.8197 0.8342 0.8325 0.7284 0.7139
Saitama 0.7925 0.7760 0.8181 0.8430 0.8500 0.8475 0.8276 0.8434 0.8415 0.7709 0.7477
Chiba 0.8019 0.7804 0.8027 0.8350 0.8447 0.8430 0.8262 0.8379 0.8500 0.7414 0.7462
Tokyo 0.8196 0.8083 0.8446 0.8706 0.8843 0.8752 0.8709 0.8855 0.8782 0.8330 0.8057
Kanagawa 0.8057 0.7844 0.8234 0.8511 0.8644 0.8632 0.8364 0.8496 0.8631 0.7810 0.6762
Niigata 0.7870 0.7672 0.7930 0.8293 0.8401 0.8379 0.8269 0.8384 0.8373 0.7440 0.7042
Toyama 0.7878 0.7767 0.8056 0.8366 0.8450 0.8473 0.8273 0.8508 0.8496 0.7714 0.7127
Ishikawa 0.8149 0.7757 0.8122 0.8486 0.8604 0.8505 0.8336 0.8533 0.8526 0.7586 0.6848
Fukui 0.8333 0.7947 0.8190 0.8490 0.8640 0.8497 0.8297 0.8514 0.8462 0.7354 0.6785
Vamanashi 0.7882 0.7572 0.8028 0.8436 0.8382 0.8450 0.8253 0.8524 0.8408 0.7784 0.7089
Nagano 0.7886 0.7760 0.8088 0.8338 0.8478 0.8451 0.8307 0.8545 0.8483 0.7552 0.7141
Gifu 0.8019 0.7530 0.8081 0.8366 0.8412 0.8288 0.8138 0.8373 0.8306 0.7423 0.7246
Shizuoka 0.8149 0.7815 0.8132 0.8408 0.8441 0.8424 0.8298 0.8395 0.8386 0.7424 0.6699
Aichi 0.8131 0.7969 0.8241 0.8533 0.8562 0.8557 0.8429 0.8463 0.8559 0.7886 0.7612
Mie 0.8154 0.7881 0.8063 0.8427 0.8463 0.8476 0.8374 0.8561 0.8590 0.7770 0.7443
Shiga 0.7965 0.7674 0.8046 0.8336 0.8353 0.8357 0.8219 0.8226 0.8460 0.7253 0.6726
Kyoto 0.8139 0.7859 0.8149 0.8480 0.8542 0.8564 0.8305 0.8409 0.8410 0.7632 0.7356
Osaka 0.7837 0.7793 0.8258 0.8627 0.8683 0.8677 0.8419 0.8513 0.8489 0.7753 0.7278
Hyogo 0.8140 0.7740 0.8131 0.8439 0.8507 0.8486 0.8415 0.8510 0.8568 0.7820 0.7541
Nara 0.7697 0.7691 0.7996 0.8320 0.8353 0.8358 0.8158 0.8300 0.8302 0.7442 0.7000
Wakayama 0.7932 0.7575 0.7963 0.8282 0.8364 0.8395 0.8245 0.8359 0.8460 0.7598 0.7290
Tottori 0.7946 0.7748 0.8069 0.8408 0.8482 0.8467 0.8402 0.8448 0.8495 0.7760 0.7000
Shimane 0.7945 0.7791 0.8066 0.8358 0.8381 0.8451 0.8321 0.8606 0.8545 0.7495 0.6884
Okayama 0.8156 0.7911 0.8214 0.8590 0.8551 0.8582 0.8458 0.8600 0.8542 0.7705 0.7473
Hiroshima 0.8017 0.7746 0.8143 0.8478 0.8574 0.8555 0.8432 0.8608 0.8602 0.7670 0.7622
Yamaguchi 0.7862 0.7728 0.8020 0.8370 0.8472 0.8450 0.8286 0.8503 0.8436 0.7617 0.7468
Tokushima 0.7934 0.7755 0.8153 0.8426 0.8592 0.8545 0.8346 0.8469 0.8498 0.7503 0.7655
Kagawa 0.8087 0.7795 0.8023 0.8317 0.8501 0.8386 0.8312 0.8424 0.8371 0.7610 0.7016
Ehime 0.8031 0.7730 0.7989 0.8368 0.8379 0.8425 0.8171 0.8361 0.8486 0.7468 0.7192
Kochi 0.8153 0.7743 0.8117 0.8478 0.8438 0.8510 0.8349 0.8465 0.8556 0.7965 0.7281
Fukuoka 0.8008 0.7767 0.8163 0.8554 0.8648 0.8483 0.8384 0.8623 0.8554 0.7561 0.7469
Saga 0.8030 0.7634 0.8077 0.8368 0.8494 0.8341 0.8212 0.8179 0.8468 0.7988 0.8257
Nagasaki 0.7356 0.7487 0.7781 0.8220 0.8206 0.8295 0.8130 0.8354 0.8296 0.7760 0.7623
Kumamoto 0.8005 0.7684 0.8025 0.8404 0.8359 0.8341 0.8234 0.8327 0.8387 0.7508 0.6781
Gita 0.8063 0.7728 0.8152 0.8409 0.8448 0.8462 0.8261 0.8471 0.8449 0.7722 0.7413
Miyazaki 0.8227 0.7642 0.8102 0.8300 0.8456 0.8388 0.8296 0.8389 0.8246 0.7289 0.7326
Kagoshima 0.7888 0.7787 0.8080 0.8449 0.8462 0.8531 0.8375 0.8408 0.8430 0.7658 0.7251
Okinawa 0.7987 0.7702 0.7873 0.8237 0.8309 0.8400 0.8196 0.8371 0.8384 0.7048 0.5583
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Table 4 Parameter of production function
(D
5
Private sector Public sector
Hokkaido 2.0755 1.9336 0.6292
Aomori 2.1520 1.9815 0.5680
Iwate 2.1357 1.9723 0.5833
Miyagi 1.9641 1.8523 0.6933
Akita 2.1217 1.9638 0.5952
Yamagata 2.0040 1.8824 0.6723
Fukushima 1.9204 1.8185 0.7146
Ibaragi 2.1021 1.9514 0.6105
Tochigi 2.1489 1.9799 0.5710
Gunma 2.0695 1.9294 0.6332
Saitama 2.1371 1.9731 0.5821
Chiba 2.1757 1.9932 0.5413
Tokyo 1.6072 1.5581 0.8377
Kanagawa 1.9603 1.8494 0.6952
Niigata 2.0266 1.8990 0.6596
Toyama 2.0205 1.8946 0.6631
Ishikawa 2.0162 1.8914 0.6655
Fukui 1.8929 1.7968 0.7272
Yamanashi 2.0509 1.9165 0.6450
Nagano 2.0377 1.9070 0.6530
Gifu 2.0539 1.9186 0.6432
Shizuoka 2.0166 1.8917 0.6653
Aichi 2.0341 1.9044 0.6552
Mie 2.0607 1.9234 0.6388
Shiga 2.2027 1.9999 0.4942
Kyoto 1.9887 1.8710 0.6805
Osaka 1.8255 1.7424 0.7563
Hyogo 2.0414 1.9097 0.6508
Nara 2.1236 1.9650 0.5937
Wakayama 2.0106 1.8873 0.6686
Tottori 2.0654 1.9267 0.6358
Shimane 2.0246 1.8976 0.6607
Okayama 2.0250 1.8979 0.6605
Hiroshima 1.9434 1.8364 0.7036
Yamaguchi 2.0721 1.9312 0.6315
Tokushima 2.0873 1.9416 0.6211
Kagawa 2.0218 1.8955 0.6623
Ehime 2.0894 1.9430 0.6197
Kochi 2.1166 1.9607 0.5993
Fukuoka 1.9691 1.8561 0.6908
Saga 1.9887 1.8710 0.6805
Nagasaki 2.1635 1.9875 0.5558
Kumamoto 2.1157 1.9601 0.6000
Gita 2.1135 1.9587 0.6017
Miyazaki 2.0172 1.8922 0.6649
Kagoshima 1.9611 1.8500 0.6948
Okinawa 2.1748 1.9928 0.5425
Table 5 The change of output level
by the Murayama tax reform
Private sector Public sector
Hokkaido 0.48% 0.49%
Aomori 0.44% 1.67%
Iwate 0.49% 0.85%
Miyagi 0.49% -1.56%
Akita 0.52% 0.80%
Yamagata 0.50% 0.70%
Fukushima 0.52% -1.18%
Ibaragi 0.46% -2.18%
Tochigi 0.41% -3.40%
Gunma 0.45% -3.41%
Saitama 0.36% 0.91%
Chiba 0.38% -0.32%
Tokyo 0.56% -5.85%
Kanagawa 0.43% -2.47%
Niigata 0.50% -0.45%
Toyama 0.52% -2.24%
Ishikawa 0.49% -3.85%
Fukui 0.54% -1.28%
Yamanashi 0.50% -1.37%
Nagano 0.58% -2.49%
Gifu 0.47% -1.65%
Shizuoka 0.46% -6.31%
Aichi 0.45% -3.48%
Mie 0.48% -2.90%
Shiga 0.40% -1.29%
Kyoto 0.45% -1.35%
Osaka 0.47% -3.99%
Hyogo 0.54% -1.71%
Nara 0.38% 2.13%
Wakayama 0.51% -0.82%
Tottori 0.49% 0.35%
Shimane 0.56% 0.58%
Okayama 0.50% -1.30%
Hiroshima 0.50% -1.70%
Yamaguchi 0.45% -0.67%
Tokushima 0.47% 0.45%
Kagawa 0.46% -1.48%
Ehime 0.47% -0.38%
Kochi 0.49% 1.18%
Fukuoka 0.47% -2.36%
Saga 0.51% 1.19%
Nagasaki 0.48% -0.53%
Kumamoto 0.45% 1.02%
Oita 0.47% 0.27%
Miyazaki 0.53% 1.27%
Kagoshima 0.52% 1.24%
Okinawa 0.49% 0.95%
Total 0.48% -1.98%
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Figure 1 The change of tax revenue per capita by switch from local transfer tax to
local consumption tax (Unit 10000 yen)
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under revenue neutral that corresponds to the concept of the differential
incidence.
In this table, we can see the change in the welfare level according to the
age class and the change in the welfare level according to each local area.
The Murayama tax reform worsened the welfare level of the young age
group, and bettered the welfare level of the age group from 40 years old to
50 years old. These results can be explained by the income difference
according to the age. In Japan, firms have adopted the seniority pay sys
tem. Therefore a person's income rises by aging in Japan. The Murayama
tax reform brings tax reductions to those in higher income classes.
Moreover, when we see the simulation result according to local areas, the
reform improves the welfare level of the household in the large city, and
depraves the welfare level of the household in a local city when examined
according to local areas. When we totaled these changes throughout Japan
as a whole, the social welfare level will be improved only by 0.07%.
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Table 6 The change of welfare level by local areas, and by age group of household
-20
years
20-24
years
25-29
years
30-34
years
35-39
years
40-44
years
45-49
years
50-54
years
55-59
years
60-64
years
65-
years
Total
Hokkaido
Aomori
Iwate
Miyagi
Akita
Yamagata
Fukushima
Ibaragi
Tochigi
Gunma
Saitama
Chiba
Tokyo
Kanagawa
Niigata
Toyama
Ishikawa
Fukui
Yamanashi
Nagano
Gifu
Shizuoka
Aichi
Mie
Shiga
Kyoto
Osaka
Hyogo
Nara
Wakayama
Tottori
Shimane
Okayama
Hiroshima
Yamaguchi
Tokushima
Kagawa
Ehime
Kochi
Fukuoka
Saga
Nagasaki
Kumamoto
Gita
Miyazaki
Kagoshima
Okinawa
Total
-0.47%
-0.49%
-0.44%
-0.43%
-0.48%
-0.45%
-0.43%
-0.43%
-0.44%
-0.42%
-0.44%
-0.43%
-0.39%
-0.41%
-0.44%
-0.44%
-0.42%
-0.40%
-0.44%
-0.44%
-0.43%
-0.42%
-0.41%
-0.41%
-0.44%
-0.42%
-0.43%
-0.42%
-0.45%
-0.45%
-0.45%
-0.45%
-0.42%
-0.42%
-0.45%
-0.45%
-0.43%
-0.44%
-0.47%
-0.43%
-0.44%
-0.51%
-0.45%
-0.46%
-0.44%
-0.46%
-0.48%
-0.37%
-0.39%
-0.36%
-0.35%
-0.37%
-0.36%
-0.35%
-0.18%
-0.38%
-0.19%
-0.19%
-0.19%
-0.14%
-0.16%
-0.36%
-0.36%
-0.36%
-0.34%
-0.19%
-0.36%
-0.31%
-0.18%
-0.16%
-0.17%
-0.21%
-0.30%
-0.17%
-0.18%
-0.19%
-0.37%
-0.36%
-0.36%
-0.35%
-0.35%
-0.36%
-0.36%
-0.36%
-0.37%
-0.37%
-0.35%
-0.36%
-0.39%
-0.37%
-0.37%
-0.36%
-0.35%
0.18%
-0.35%
-0.23%
-0.17%
-0.33%
-0.17%
-0.24%
-0.33%
-0.35%
-0.36%
-0.36%
-0.35%
-0.37%
0.19%
-0.34%
-0.35%
-0.34%
-0.34%
-0.33%
-0.35%
-0.35%
-0.35%
-0.34%
-0.34%
-0.35%
-0.38%
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-0.33%
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0.24%
0.19%
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0.23%
-0.21%
-0.23%
-0.34%
-0.11%
0.17%
0.20%
0.23%
0.18%
0.18%
0.20%
0.26%
0.20%
0.19%
0.23%
0.11%
0.23%
0.22%
0.16%
-0.33%
-0.32%
0.04%
0.19%
-0.34%
-0.34%
0.19%
-0.34%
-0.33%
0.19%
-0.32%
-0.36%
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-0.32%
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0.22%
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0.26%
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0.04%
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0.03%
0.99%
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0.19%
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-0.25%
0.11%
0.25%
-0.24%
0.06%
-0.25%
0.02%
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0.09%
0.05%
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0.25%
-0.33%
-0.33%
0.22%
0.25%
0.18%
0.24%
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0.18%
-0.34%
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-0.32%
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0.16%
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0.05%
0.05%
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0.23%
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0.05%
-0.23%
-0.17%
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0.04%
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-0.26%
-0.22%
1.15%
-0.22%
0.06%
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0.18%
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0.16%
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1.21%
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-0.24%
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0.24%
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-0.22%
0.03%
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-0.26%
0.22%
0.07%
-0.33%
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0.19%
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0.24%
0.25%
0.16%
0.04%
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0.24%
0.03%
0.23%
-0.24%
-0.01%
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0.63%
-0.24%
0.96%
0.96%
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-0.08%
0.04%
-0.10%
-0.23%
0.07%
0.96%
0.06%
-0.15%
0.99%
-0.08%
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-0.12%
1.28%
-0.08%
1.28%
0.66%
-0.23%
-0.25%
0.23%
0.06%
-0.03%
0.05%
0.05%
0.08%
0.03%
-0.26%
-0.22%
0.24%
0.02%
0.03%
0.03%
0.25%
-0.25%
0.21%
-0.25%
-0.36%
0.15%
-0.24%
0.21%
0.15%
-0.24%
-0.07%
0.02%
-0.27%
0.04%
0.03%
-0.08%
1.30%
0.05%
0.03%
-0.25%
-0.24%
0.03%
-0.26%
-0.11%
0.03%
1.11%
-0.04%
1.10%
0.06%
-0.06%
0.06%
0.04%
-0.26%
0.22%
0.17%
-0.26%
0.05%
-0.25%
-0.26%
-0.26%
-0.25%
0.21%
-0.25%
0.26%
-0.27%
0.21%
0.22%
-0.35%
0.21%
-0.36%
-0.38%
-0.23%
-0.21%
-0.36%
-0.20%
-0.21%
-0.36%
-0.40%
-0.39%
-0.40%
0.13%
0.13%
-0.25%
-0.29%
-0.39%
-0.38%
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-0.38%
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-0.38%
-0.40%
-0.39%
0.19%
0.16%
-0.43%
0.16%
0.21%
0.20%
-0.40%
0.13%
-0.20%
-0.39%
-0.37%
-0.37%
-0.38%
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-0.38%
-0.38%
-0.36%
-0.37%
-0.17%
-0.39%
-0.38%
-0.38%
-0.36%
-0.19%
-0.25%
-0.44%
-0.48%
-0.44%
-0.42%
-0.44%
-0.46%
-0.41%
-0.42%
-0.25%
-0.42%
-0.42%
0.08%
0.18%
-0.43%
-0.24%
-0.31%
-0.26%
-0.41%
-0.43%
-0.42%
-0.41%
-0.26%
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-0.34%
-0.46%
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-0.40%
0.11%
-0.44%
-0.41%
-0.43%
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-0.40%
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-0.41%
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-0.40%
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0.14%
-0.43%
0.07%
-0.41%
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-0.14%
-0.18%
-0.05%
-0.06%
-0.02%
-0.14%
-0.06%
0.13%
-0.03%
-0.05%
0.13%
0.31%
0.06%
0.15%
-0.04%
-0.08%
-0.12%
-0.05%
-0.02%
-0.04%
-0.04%
0.05%
0.29%
0.19%
0.25%
0.23%
0.10%
0.35%
0.08%
-0.05%
-0.06%
0.00%
-0.05%
-0.05%
-0.13%
-0.06%
-0.05%
-0.12%
-0.07%
-0.09%
-0.10%
-0.17%
-0.08%
-0.13%
-0.14%
-0.06%
-0.18%
0.07%
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5. Concluding remarks
The Murayama tax reform barely Improves the social welfare level as a
result of the simulation analysis. However, the degree of the Improvement
Is very small. The cause Is In the method of the tax cut. The marginal tax
rate has not changed so much because the tax cut were done by Increasing
the minimum taxable floor. We think that It Is necessary to reduce further
marginal tax rate to Improve efficiency.
It has been understood to reduce the revenue difference between local
governments as an effect of the Introduction of the local consumption tax.
Because the revenue difference between local governments Is very large In
Japan, a strong transfer from the central government to the local govern
ments has been executed. However, the strong fiscal equalization system
will weaken the financial responsibility of the local governments. Therefore,
the Murayama tax reform can be evaluated as a preparation for fiscal
decentralization.
Kyoji Hashimoto
(Professor of Public Finance, Kansai University)
Toshiyuki Uemura
(JSPS Research Fellow, Kwansei-gakuin University)
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